ECTURES  ON  PATROLS, 

ADVANCE  GUARDS, 

AND  OUTPOSTS 


BY 


MAJOR  JOHN  F.  MORRISON, 

GENERAL  STAFF 


Fort  Leavenworth,  Kari 

&«  rbtce 

1917 


LECTURES  ON  PATROLS, 

ADVANCE  GUARDS, 

AND  OUTPOSTS 


BY 


MAJOR  JOHN  F.  MORRISON, 

i/ 

GENERAL  STAFF 


Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas: 

>e  armp  Serbtce  Schools 

1917 


*7 


Introduction 


AST  May  at  Camp  Douglas,  Wisconsin,  was  held 
*-J  a  convention  of  the  officers  of  the  National 
Guard  of  that  state. 

During  the  winter  in  their  correspondence  school, 
they  had  studied  patrolling,  advance  guards,  and 
outposts.  At  their  convention  it  was  proposed  to  go 
over  these  subjects  again  and  clear  up  misunder- 
standings. 

General  Boardman,  who  organized  the  whole 
scheme  of  instruction,  asked  me  to  come  up  and 
help. 

The  idea  was  for  me  to  make  a  short  talk  on 
each  subject  and  then  on  the  ground  explain  fully 
each  point,  after  which  a  map  problem  was  given  out 
for  solution. 

Of  course  there  was  no  set  lecture;  my  notes 
were  very  brief;  it  was  largely  conversational,  ask- 
ing questions  and  answering  more  of  them.  Ground 
was  selected  that  illustrated  the  different  points. 
My  work  was  in  no  way  a  substitute  for  Security 
and  Information  and  the  Field  Service  Regulations, 
but  was  supplemental  thereto. 

I  have  since  been  asked  to  write  out  these  lec- 
tures or  talks.  In  trying  to  put  them  in  such  shape 
that  the  ideas  will  be  clear  to  one  reading  them,  I 
find  many  difficulties.  They  were  intended  for  a 
different  use. 

JOHN  F.  MORRISON, 

Major,  General  Staff,  Senior  Instructor, 
Department  of  Military  Art. 

THE  ARMY  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 

Fort  Leavemvorth,  Kansas, 

November  1, 1909. 

3 

348666 


Patrolling 


"  A  commander  may  be  excused  for  being 
defeated,  but  never  for  being  surprised." 

T  N  talking  on  this  important  subject,  it  is  not  deemed 

necessary  to  repeat  what  is  in  the  manuals  in 
unmistakable  terms,  but  merely  to  add  something  in 
the  way  of  explanation  and  interpretation. 

The  importance  of  this  part  of  our  work  has 
greatly  increased  in  late  years. 

As  an  example,  take  our  outposts.  Under  pres- 
ent conditions  we  no  longer  contemplate,  except  in 
very  rare  cases,  an  unbroken  line  of  sentinels,  but 
rather  a  great  deal  of  patrolling  and  fewer  sentinels. 
This  is  less  exhausting  to  our  men  and  more  effective. 

While  on  the  march,  whether  forward  or  in  re- 
treat, we  must  have  information  that  can  be  obtained 
only  by  patrolling. 

We  must  have  information  of  our  enemy  before 
a  combat.  Fifty  years  ago  such  information  could 
be  more  easily  obtained;  ranges  were  shorter. 

Today  much  of  success  depends  on  keeping  the 
enemy  in  ignorance  of  our  movements  and  location, 
and  still  more  in  knowing  his  every  move. 

With  the  present  tendency  in  the  color  of  uni- 
forms and  the  enemy's  efforts  to  keep  us  in  the 
dark  as  to  his  location  and  movements,  how  are  we 
to  gain  this  information,  how  prevent  the  enemy 
from  gaining  more  than  is  avoidable?  Primarily  by 
patrols,  more  or  less  backed  up  by  larger  bodies. 
Much  of  this  work  must  and  will  be  done  by  the 
cavalry.  It  will  do  patrolling  at  a  distance  and  until 
armies  come  into  close  contact. 
5 


But  after  the  armies  are  in  contact  the  infantry 
patrols  will  have  to  be  numerous  and  industrious. 

Patrols  may  be  sent  out  to  gain  information  of 
the  enemy,  or  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  gaining 
information,  or  it  may  be  a  combination  of  the  two. 
Besides  there  are  many  occasions  for  sending  a  patrol 
on  a  special  mission  of  some  kind.  The  leading  and 
conduct  of  the  patrol  must  vary  with  the  conditions 
of  the  problem.  There  can  be  no  fixed  form,  no 
hard  and  fast  rules  to  be  learned  that  will  make  us 
efficient  patrol  leaders. 

Let  us  look  at  the  problem  of  the  commander 
who  sends  out  the  patrol. 

Patrols  should  be  used  freely.  This  does  not 
mean  sending  out  patrols  that  can  be  of  no  value.  It 
is  much  better  to  use  patrols  to  gain  information 
than  to  butt  in  with  a  larger  force  and  have  it  butch- 
ered. A  good  patrol  can  with  less  risk  get  you  in- 
formation without  which  you  may  sacrifice  a  large 
part  of  your  command. 

In  determining  the  number  of  men  to  be  sent  in 
any  given  patrol,  you  should  bear  in  mind  that  the 
smaller  it  is  the  better,  provided  it  is  strong  enough 
to  carry  out  its  mission. 

The  work  is  often  hard  and  dangerous  and  such 
work  should  never  be  required  unnecessarily.  The 
smaller  the  party  the  more  easily  it  can  be  concealed 
when  necessary.  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  large 
enough  to  accomplish  its  mission.  If  messages  are 
likely  to  be  sent  back  before  the  patrol  finishes, 
enough  men  must  be  in  the  party  so  that  after  de- 
ducting these  messengers,  there  will  still  be  enough 
left  to  finish  the  work.  If  it  be  only  to  gain  some 
point,  look  around,  and  return  with  no  idea  of  fight- 
ing, two  men  will  probably  answer  better  than  more. 
If  the  patrol  is  to  drive  back,  or  resist  hostile  patrols  if 
met,  more  men  must  be  sent. 


rr 

Before  sending  out  a  patrol,  have  clearly  in  your 
mind  what  you  expect  of  it,  what  it  will  probably 
have  to  do;  then  determine  the  minimum  number  of 
men  necessary  for  such  work  and  assign  that  number. 

Less  than  two  men  should  never  be  sent. 

Next,  select  the  man  to  lead  the  patrol. 

Patrols  differ  greatly  in  their  importance  and  in 
the  difficulty  of  leading  them.  On  outposts,  much  of 
the  patrolling  between  groups  and  along  parts  of  the 
line  is  simple  in  its  nature,  and  leaders  can  practically 
be  taken  from  a  roster.  Any  average  soldier  should 
be  able  to  act  as  such  leader.  The  same  is  true  of 
many  of  the  patrols  sent  from  an  advance  or  rear 
guard.  But  sometimes  the  flanking  patrol  in  an 
advance  guard  will  have  a  task  of  greater  difficulty. 
The  leader  will  have  to  cover  considerable  space 
with  few  men;  the  correct  leading  will  require  an 
eye  for  ground,  judging  as  to  what  features  are 
necessary  to  be  examined,  and  ability  to  read  "indi- 
cations/' He  will  generally  need  good  judgment, 
courage,  endurance  and  tactical  ability  in  handling 
his  patrol. 

Again  a  patrol  is  pushed  out  on  a  road  simply  to 
watch  and  give  warning.  No  great  ability  is  re- 
quired for  this,  nor  very  special  training.  But  a 
patrol  is  sent  out  to  gain  information.  It  must  push 
far  from  support,  in  country  where  the  enemy  is 
close;  it  may  be  just  before  a  battle.  The  leader 
must  be  able  to  estimate  the  strength  of  hostile  com- 
mands (often  not  easy),  to  judge  of  dispositions,  to 
read  indications  of  various  kinds,  and  be  accurate 
and  reliable.  He  must  also  possess  judgment,  cour- 
age, and  endurance.  Such  patrol  leaders  can  not  be 
detailed  by  '  'roster. " 

In  giving  your  orders  to  the  patrol  leader,  make 
them  clear  and  full  enough  so  that  he  can  fully 
grasp  the  situation,  know  what  he  is  to  do,  and  know 


— 8— 

all  that  is  known  of  the  enemy  so  far  as  it  affects  his 
problem. 

The  occasions  when  patrols  will  be  detailed  are 
too  many  to  be  all  given.  Their  use  with  the  cover- 
ing detachments  (advance  and  rear  guards  and  out- 
posts) are  known  to  you  all.  In'  combat  of  small 
isolated  commands,  if  the  exact  location  of  the  enemy 
is  unknown,  and  you  are  in  doubt  as  to  the  lay  of  the 
ground,  reconnaissance  must  be  made  before  attack- 
ing. This  will  often  call  for  patrols.  During  such  a 
combat  patrols  should  cover  your  flanks  both  in  the 
offense  and  defense.  As  in  large  commands  cavalry 
or  detachments  of  some  strength  are  posted  so  as  to 
guard  against  flanking  movements  by  the  enemy,  so 
in  small  commands  you  must  do  the  same,  but  with 
patrols  varying  from  two  or  three  men  to  a  squad  or 
section. 

When  armies  remain  in  contact— that  is,  with' 
their  outposts  close,  as  often  happened  in  our  Civil 
War— much  patrolling  of  a  different  kind  will  be  re- 
quired. Each  side  will  endeavor  to  learn  everything 
possible  about  the  other,  as  much  as  possible  of 
his  movements,  and  early  information  of  his  in- 
tentions. Cavalry  will  be  working  to  the  flanks  and 
rear,  but  it  will  be  infantry  along  the  line. 

As  to  patrol  leaders: 

You  are  all  familiar  with  the  elements  of  patrol 
leading;  but  there  are  some  points  which,  though 
you  know  them,  have  not  made  the  impression  on 
your  mind  that  they  Should.  They  are  among  the 
things  you  vaguely  know,  but  don't  apply. 

The  first  thing  I  want  to  call  to  your  attention  is 
this— whenever  you  have  to  lead  a  patrol,  know 
positively  your  "  mission/'  You  receive  an  order  to 
go  somewhere  for  some  purpose. 

This  may,  or  may  not  be  sufficient.     Be  sure  you 


—9— 

fully  understand  the  situation— exactly  what  is  ex- 
pected and  wanted.  Remember  that  a  patrol  is  often 
very  much  in  the  same  situation  as  a  detached  force 
whose  commander  must  act  on  his  own  initiative  for 
the  general  object.  You  cannot  in  general  wait  to 
receive  more  definite  instruction;  you  must  determine 
whether  your  mission  calls  upon  you  to  go  ahead  or 
back  out  when  an  unexpected  great  risk  presents 
itself,  or,  in  fact,  how  to  act  in  many  emergencies. 

Bear  in  mind  that,  as  a  general  rule,  patrols  are 
sent  out  to  gain  information— not  to  fight.  Little 
combats  between  individuals,  or  patrols,  can  have 
no  real  effect  on  the  greater  issue;  so  as  a  rule  you 
should  avoid  fighting.  But  don't  apply  this  rule  too 
generally;  it  has  numerous  exceptions.  In  all  these 
cases,  if  you  have  fully  grasped  your  mission,  you 
can  promptly  answer  for  yourself,  when  you  meet  a 
hostile  patrol,  "Shall  I  shoot  it  up  or  let  it  go  by?" 

Another  point  to  consider  in  connection  with 
patrols  is  the  message  to  be  sent  back. 

We  all  recognize  the  fact  that  the  sooner  infor- 
mation reaches  headquarters,  as  a  rule,  the  more 
valuable  it  is.  But  this  only  applies  to  information 
that  has  value.  If  in  doubt  as  to  whether  informa- 
tion would  be  valuable  or  otherwise,  give  headquarters 
the  benefit  of  the  doubt  and  send  it  in.  If  you  have 
fully  grasped  your  mission,  you  can  generally  tell 
whether  the  information  you  have  gained  should  be 
reported  or  kept  until  the  patrol  returns. 

Messages  must  be  carefully  expressed;  be  sure 
that  they  are  accurate.  This  does  not  mean  that 
something  told  you  should  not  be  reported,  but  it 
should  be  reported,  not  as  a  fact,  but  as  it  is— a  state- 
ment by  somebody  else.  It  is  well  to  add  any  in- 
formation about  your  informant,  such  as  his  credi- 
bility, the  probability  of  his  having  correct  inf  orma- 


—lo- 
tion, etc.     This  sometimes  helps  at  headquarters  in 
determining  the  probability  of  the  report. 

Observe  everything  and  remember  that  even 
apparent  trifles  may  be  of  great  value.  The  finding 
of  a  shoulder  strap  showing  a  man's  regiment  may 
enable  the  chief  of  staff  to  determine  that  the  enemy 
has  been  reinforced,  etc. 

We  find  plenty  of  instructions  as  to  what  a 
patrol  leader  must  carry,  but  not  enough  stress  is 
laid  on  the  things  he  must  not  carry.  Nothing  must 
be  carried  which,  in  case  you  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy,  either  dead  or  alive,  will  give  him  valu- 
able information.  Among  the  prohibited  articles 
should  be  orders  giving  dispositions  or  other  infor- 
mation that  would  be  valuable;  maps  that  the  enemy 
may  not  have  of  the  country,  and  especially  such 
maps  as  have  the  location  of  troops  marked  thereon. 
The  Japanese  even  remove  all  insignia  from  the  uni- 
forms of  the  men. 

Another  thing,  a  patrol  for  important  work  in 
close  proximity  to  the  enemy  should  be  carefully  se- 
lected and  instructed  not  to  give  information  to  the 
enemy  if  captured. 

Prisoners  taken  in  battle  can  generally  give 
little  information  of  importance  to  the  enemy— the 
final  clash  clears  up  doubt;  but  a  patrol  taken  before 
a  battle,  while  so  much  is  still  dark,  may  give  in- 
formation of  vital  importance. 

Let  us  try  to  illustrate  some  of  these  points. 

See  the  two-inch  map  of  Fort  Leavenworth  and 
vicinity. 

A  Northern  army  is  at  Atchison,  thirty  miles 
north  of  Leavenworth;  a  Southern  army  at  Kansas 
City,  thirty  miles  southeast  of  Leavenworth.  All 
the  country  shown  on  the  map  is  Northern  territory. 

The  Southern  army  commander  has  sent  out  a 
regiment  of  infantry  to  seize  and  hold  Weston,  his 


—11— 

latest  information  being  that  there  are  no  hostile 
troops  south  of  Atchison.  The  northern  commander 
has  sent  two  battalions  of  infantry  to  Weston;  to 
hold  the  place.  He  knew  of  no  movement  of  troops 
from  the  south. 

The  Northern  detachment  reached  Weston  Octo- 
ber 1st.  The  Southern  detachment  reached  Platte 
City  the  same  evening. 

On  the  morning  of  October  2d  the  Southern 
regiment  resumed  its  march  on  Weston,  in  ignorance 
of  the  proximity  of  hostile  troops.  As  the  head  of 
the  advance  guard  reaches  27,  hostile  patrols  are 
seen  to  the  front,  and  on  both  flanks,  withdrawing 
in  the  general  direction  of  Weston,  The  colonel  de- 
termines to  halt  until,  by  means  of  patrols,  he  can 
find  out  something  of  what  is  in  his  front.  He  calls 
up  Lieutenant  B  and  gives  him  the  following  order: 

"Hostile  infantry  patrols  have  been  seen  on 
both  of  our  flanks  and  to  our  front.  You  know  that 
the  inhabitants  are  hostile.  I  do  not  care  to  advance 
beyond  this  ridge  until  I  know  more  about  what 
hostile  troops  are  in  the  vicinity.  I  am  sending  a 
patrol  well  to  the  south  of  the  road,  another  well  to 
the  north.  You  will  take  eight  men  from  the  1st 
battalion  and  follow  the  general  direction  of  the 
road  as  far  as  Weston  if  possible.  Major  A  has  been 
ordered  to  furnish  you  with  the  men." 

Lieutenant  B  assembles  his  patrol  and  inspects 
it  to  see  that  they  have  what  they  should  carry,  that 
they  have  nothing  they  should  not  carry  and  that 
the  men  are  all  in  good  physical  condition.  At  the 
same  time  he  determines  his  mission. 

He  is  to  gain  information.  That  is  plain.  Hos- 
tile troops  must  be  near  by  for  infantry  patrols  do 
not  extend  very  far.  These  hostile  patrols  have 
probably  been  watching  the  Southern  troops.  The 
inhabitants  are  hostile  to  the  South  and  friendly  to 


—12— 

the  North;  and  from  the  patrols  and  inhabitants,  the 
Northern  troops  probably  know  all  about  the  South- 
ern force.  There  is  little  object  in  the  patrol's  trying 
to  prevent  them  from  gaining  information.  The 
regimental  commander  knows  hostile  troops  are 
near;  there  is  no  need  to  inform  him  of  that  fact. 
What  he  does  want  to  know  is  where  they  are,  how 
many  there  are  and  what  they  propose  to  do. 

Lieutenant  B  then  studies  the  ground,  and  selects 
his  route  so  as  to  follow  generally  the  road,  but  in 
such  a  way  'to  give  him  concealment  when  desired. 
He  then  starts  out. 

Near  29,  Lieutenant  B  sees  a  hostile  patrol  about 
600  yards  to  his  right  front.  He  watches  it  from 
concealment  for  some  time  and  determines  that  there 
are  only  four  men  in  the  party;  that  they  are  mov- 
ing towards  the  Southern  main  column. 

Two  questions  now  present  themselves  to  Lieut. 
B.  First,  should  he  attack  these  men?  He  answers 
in  the  negative,  for  these  reasons:  the  noise  will  at- 
tract attention  to  him  and  decrease  the  chances  of 
his  gaining  the  desired  information;  this  hostile 
patrol,  even  if  it  sees  the  Southern  regiment,  will 
gain  no  valuable  information  other  than  what  they 
already  have;  the  chance  of  his  getting  a  prisoner  is 
not  sure  enough  to  warrant  such  a  move  at  this 
stage;  there  remains  no  other  reason  then  for  an 
attack  except  to  kill  or  wound  that  many  of  the 
enemy,  and,  in  the  meantime,  he  may  have  some  of 
his  own  men  hit.  These  small  combats,  of  themselves, 
do  no  good.  Second,  should  he  send  back  word  to 
the  regimental  commander  that  he  has  seen  this 
patrol?  He  answers  this  also  in  the  negative.  The 
colonel  knows  there  are  patrols  about;  this  should  be 
reported  when  he  returns,  of  course,  but  men  should 
not  be  detached  to  hurry  back  with  the  information. 

Now  let  us  assume  that  Lieutenant  B  later  gets 


—13— 

a  view  of  the  road  leading  northeast  from  31,  and 
sees  what  he  estimates  as  a  battalion  of  infantry 
marching  northeast  thereon.  What  should  he  do? 
Does  he  go  back  with  the  news,  or  send  word  back 
and  continue  on?  He  must  not  quit  yet,  he  must 
make  sure  there  are  no  more  troops,  and  he  must 
find  out  also  where  these  are  going.  But  this  much 
news  is  important,  so  he  promptly  writes  a  message 
stating  what  he  has  seen  and  sends  it  back  to  the 
colonel  by  two  men.  He  then  proceeds  on  toward 
Weston.  Another  question  arises  at  this  point.  He 
knows  of  that  road  turning  north  at  35.  Is  this 
battalion  which  he  has  seen  moving  towards  37  to 
get  on  the  flank  of  the  Southern  main  body,  or  it  it 
going  north,  probably  retreating  via  35?  He  knows 
that  there  was  another  patrol  sent  to  the  north  that 
should  see  and  report  this.  But  its  importance  is  so 
vital,  and  accidents  to  patrols  are  so  liable  to  happen, 
that  Lieutenant  B  should  take  no  chances.  He,  there- 
fore, detaches  the  corporal  and  one  man  with  orders 
to  conceal  themselves  where  they  can  see  35  and 
watch;  and  as  soon  as  they  determine  which  route 
the  battalion  is  taking,  to  hurry  back  and  report  the 
same  to  the  colonel. 

With  the  remainder  of  the  patrol  he  wpuld  push 
on  to  Weston  and  try  to  determine  whether  there 
were  more  troops  in  the  vicinity  and  if  so,  their 
number  and  location. 

Let  us  suppose  a  different  outcome,  and  that 
Lieutenant  B  did  not  see  any  troops  before  reaching 
Weston,  except  the  patrol. 

He  approaches  Weston  and  with  his  glass  care- 
fully searches  the  village  for  signs  of  hostile  occu- 
pation. He  sees  none.  He  then  sends  two  or  three 
men  in,  and  as  nothing  develops,  he  follows  and 
carefully  examines  the  place.  No  enemy  is  found, 
but  a  boy  tells  him  that  there  are  a  lot  of  soldiers 


—14— 

camped  on  the  road  leading  to  the  northwest,  about 
one  mile  from  the  village.  What  does  Lieutenant  B 
do  now?  His  orders  were  to  go  as  far  as  Weston; 
he  has  done  so.  Should  he  now  return?  If  he  thor- 
oughly appreciates  his  mission,  he  will  not.  He  was 
to  find  out  about  the  enemy.  All  he  knows  is  what 
the  boy  tells  him.  Not  very  satisfactory.  If  he 
goes  a  short  distance  farther  he  may  get  positive  in- 
formation. 

Lieutenant  B  decides  to  go  on.  He  first  writes 
a  report  of  what  he  has  seen  and  heard  and  sends  it 
back  by  two  men.  In  his  report  he  gives  his  source 
of  information,  and  might  add  whether  he  believes 
the  boy  to  be  truthful,  judging  by  the  boy's  manner, 
etc. 

Lieutenant  B  now  goes  on,  not  directly,  but  se- 
lects a  route  that  will  give  him  an  unobserved  ap- 
proach if  possible  and  which  would  tend  to  mislead 
the  inhabitants  in  the  village. 

Suppose  he  reaches  a  point  from  which  he  can 
see  the  hostile  camp.  Now  comes  in  his  ability  to 
estimate  the  strength  of  the  force,  the  arm  or  arms 
of  which  it  is  composed,  whether  apparently  indiffer- 
ent to  our  presence  or  evidently  preparing  for  some 
movement,  etc. 

If  he  determines  the  force  to  be  greatly  superior 
to  ours— then  he  should  withdraw  at  once  and  report 
in  person  to  the  colonel  what  he  has  seen;  for  an  at- 
tack on  the  camp  will  be  improbable  and  the  colonel 
will  want  his  detachments  in  so  that  he  can  with- 
draw. On  the  other  hand  if  he  finds  the  hostile  force 
to  be  only  a  battalion  or  two  at  the  most,  what  then? 
Lieutenant  B  would  at  once  send  this  information  by 
two  of  his  men,  stating  in  his  report  that  he  is  re- 
maining for  the  present  in  observation. 

Why  this  action?  The  colonel  should  know  at 
the  earliest  moment  the  strength  and  location  of  the 


—15— 

enemy,  so  no  time  must  be  lost  in  getting  the  word 
to  him. 

But  the  hostile  force  is  so  much  inferior  to  ours 
and  knowing  the  colonel's  mission,  Lieutenant  B 
can  foresee  an  attack.  This  will  require  more  in- 
formation and  Lieutenant  B  tries  to  get  it.  The  ter- 
rain should  be  studied  to  enable  the  colonel  to  plan 
his  attack,  the  outpost  line  should  be  determined, 
where  the  enemy's  position  would  probably  be  if 
attacked,  etc. 

Lieutenant  B,  here  having  accomplished  all  that 
he  can,  starts  back.  He  avoids  the  route  he  came, 
especially  the  village  of  Weston. 

Here  note  one  thing:  the  enemy  was  reported 
only  about  one  mile  distant.  Had  this  distance  been 
two  or  three  miles,  Lieutenant  B  would  hardly  have 
been  justified  in  going  on.  The  distance  would  have 
been  too  great  for  an  infantry  patrol,  though  a  cav- 
alry patrol  would  have  pushed  on. 

Let  us  now  follow  a  patrol  under  Lieutenant  A 
sent  out  from  the  force  near  Weston  that  morning. 
The  commander  at  Weston  hears  early  on  this  morn- 
ing a  rumor  to  the  effect  that  hostile  troops  are  ap- 
proaching from  the  south.  He  occupies  a  good  posi- 
tion north  of  Weston  and  sends  out  patrols  to  look 
for  the  enemy.  Lieutenant  A  leads  one  of  them. 
He  first  sees  a  patrol  of  the  enemy;  no  other  troops 
are  in  sight.  He  at  once  reports  this  to  his  com- 
mander, sending  back  the  message  by  one  of  his 
men.  Here  are  two  points  of  difference  from  the 
action  of  Lieutenant  B— Lieutenant  A  sends  a  mes- 
sage back  reporting  the  seeing  of  a  patrol  and  he 
sends  his  message  by  one  man.  Why  this  difference? 
When  Lieutenant  B  saw  the  patrol  his  commander 
already  knew  that  hostile  patrols  were  in  the  vicinity, 
but  in  the  case  of  Lieutenant  A,  his  commander  did 
not  know  positively  that  there  was  an  enemy  any- 


—16— 

where  in  the  vicinity.  This  information  fixes  the 
fact  and  it  should  be  communicated  at  once.  He 
sends  only  one  man  with  his  message,  for  he  feels 
quite  sure  that  there  are  none  of  the  enemy  between 
him  and  his  main  force;  he  knows  that  the  inhabi- 
tants are  all  friendly  and  they  will  help  rather  than 
hinder  his  messenger.  How  was  it  with  Lieutenant 
B?  Hostile  patrols  were  in  the  country  and  the  in- 
habitants were  all  hostile,  therefore,  two  men  were 
required. 

Lieutenant  A  now  gets  a  position  from  which  he 
can  seethe  column  on  the  road.  He  determines  its 
composition  and  direction  of  march.  This  informa- 
tion is  then  sent  back  and  he  proceeds,  keeping  the 
column  in  sight.  Finally  he  sees  the  column  halt 
and  march  outposts  formed. 

Let  us  suppose  that  his  orders  were  to  return  as 
soon  as  he  determined  the  strength  of  the  hostile 
command.  This  he  did  and  when  near  camp,  but 
before  it  was  in  sight,  he  saw  a  hostile  patrol  of 
eight  men  approaching.  His  patrol  is  now  reduced 
to  four,  and  he  has  not  been  observed.  What  should 
he  do?  Lieutenant  A  opens  the  most  effective  fire 
possible  on  the  hostile  patrol  and  'endeavors  to  pre- 
vent its  advance.  His  action,  as  well  as  his  problem, 
is  very  different  from  that  of  Lieutenant  B  when  he 
saw  the  hostile  patrol.  Lieutenant  A  has  all  the  in- 
formation he  can  get,  the  enemy  he  believes  is  still 
in  the  dark  as  to  the  location  and  strength  of  the 
northern  force.  If  this  patrol  is  allowed  to  proceed 
it  may  gain  information  of  great  value  to  the  enemy. 
This  he  tries  to  prevent. 

Patrols,  sent  out  to  gain  some  specific  and  im- 
portant information,  should,  as  a  rule,  avoid  fighting. 
The  enemy's  patrols,  however,  can  not  be  allowed 
to  roam  about  without  danger,  but  even  so  it  will 
generally  be  better  to  intrust  their  intimidation  to 


—17— 

others  than  the  special  patrols  sent  out  after  informa- 
tion. 

A  patrol  seeking  some  special  and  important  in- 
formation, comes  near  to  a  point  where,  from  a  cer- 
tain position,  it  can  see  and  gain  the  information  de- 
sired, but  the  position  is  found  to  be  occupied  by  the 
enemy.  Careful  reconnaissance  leads  the  patrol 
leader  to  believe  that  he  is  at  least  equal  to  the 
enemy  in  this  locality.  A  vigorous  attack  is  justified 
in  order  to  gain  the  view. 

A  great  number  of  situations  can  be  drawn  but 
it  is  not  necessary.  For,  after  you  have  had  them 
all  presented,  it  is  probable  that  the  first  one  coming 
up  in  the  field  would  be  different.  But  if  you  have 
grasped  the  principles,  you  can  solve  it.  Practice  is 
the  only  sure  help.  Make  problems  for  yourself  and 
reason  out  what  you  should  do  and  why,  and  soon 
you  will  acquire  facility.  Practice  on  the  ground 
with  men  is  still  more  valuable. 

One  important  point  I  want  to  impress  upon  you. 
Get  information  back  to  headquarters  if  you  get  any. 
At  many  maneuvers  I  have  known  patrols  to  go  out, 
see  the  enemy  and  never  report  the  fact  until  long 
after.  There  is  no  good  in  a  patrol  gaining  informa- 
tion if  it  is  not  sent  in  or  is  sent  in  after  the  enemy 
attacks. 

The  necessity  and  importance  of  efficient  patrol- 
ling and  reconnaissance  are  taught  by  the  history  of 
war.  In  the  Civil  War  it  was  neglected  in  many 
cases  at  heavy  cost. 

Such  was  the  case,  not  alone  in  this  war,  but  in 
many  others.  We  have  not  been  the  only  offenders. 

The  problems  presented  are  varied  and  require 
for  their  solution  men  varying  in  capacity,  from  the 
average  private  to  the  best  trained  staff  officer. 

For  the  higher  class  of  patrol  leading  the  re- 
quirements can  not  be  learned  entirely  from  books. 
The  leader  must  be  cool,  determined  and  persistent. 


—18— 

He  must  grasp  the  situation,  understand  the  signifi- 
cance of  what  he  sees  and  hears,  must  be  possessed 
of  good  judgment  and  not  afraid  to  take  responsi- 
bility. 

For  the  greater  part  of  the  many  patrols  re- 
quired, only  physical  strength  and  good  average  in- 
telligence are  necessary. 


Advance     and     Rear 
Guards 


A  S  IN  the  case  of  patrols,  I  am  not  here  to  give 
*  *•  you  a  compilation  of  what  is  in  your  manuals, 
but  to  bring  out  and  emphasize  a  few  points  as  far 
as  time  permits— points  not  too  clearly  expressed  in 
the  books. 

In  our  manuals  we  have,  in  the  case  of  all  the 
covering  detachments,  a  normal  formation,  yet,  in 
every  case,  they  prescribe  that  conditions  may  change 
this.  My  experience  has  shown  that  too  many  offi- 
cers are  prone  to  adhere  to  the  prescribed  formation, 
even  when  it  results  in  an  absurdity.  A  normal 
formation  can  be  of  value  only  as  it  helps  one  to 
understand  the  tactical  principles  that  underlie  the 
use  of  covering  detachments.  They  are  not  models 
to  be  blindly  followed,  and  it  is  questionable  if  they 
are  not  often  harmful. 

A  much  better  method  than  learning  a  normal 
formation  is  to  learn  the  principles,  and  practice  ap- 
plying them  to  concrete  cases. 

In  other  words,  in  every  problem  determine  your 
own  mission  clearly — i.e.,  what  you  are  to  do  and 
why.  Bear  in  mind  certain  fundamental  principles 
and  use  your  common  sense. 

Now  let  us  try  this  system  in  the  case  of  an  ad- 
vance guard. 

What  is  the  object  of  having  an  advance  guard? 

First.— To  prevent  the  main  body  of  our  troops 
from  being  shot  into  while  in  a  formation  that  pre- 
vents their  effectively  defending  themselves. 

You  can  all  guess  at  the  effect  of  an  unexpected 
heavy  fire  at  effective  range  on  a  column  of  squads 
in  a  road. 

19 


—20— 

Second.  —Under  modern  conditions  the  haphaz- 
ard throwing  of  troops  into  action  has  every  chance 
of  resulting-  in  a  disaster.  If  you  expect  to  win  in  a 
battle  you  must  have  an  understanding  of  the  situa- 
tion and  must  so  put  in  your  troops  as  to  best  meet 
conditions;  remembering  that  troops  once  engaged 
can  only  go  forward,  stay  where  they  are,  or  retreat. 
This  requires  that  enough  troops  be  told  off  for  the 
advance  guard  to  enable  it  to  be  the  first  to  strike 
the  enemy  and  then  be  strong  enough  to  hold  him 
until  the  commander  can  size  up  the  situation,  form 
his  plan,  and  properly  deploy  his  main  body  to  best 
meet  the  situation.  On  the  other  hand,  it  should  be 
no  larger  than  necessary,  following  the  rule  that  all 
detachments  from  the  main  body  should  be  as  small 
as  practicable. 

Third. — The  march  of  the  main  body  must  not 
be  delayed  by  small  bodies  of  the  enemy;  these  must 
be  brushed  aside.  Do  not  allow  a  skillfully  handled 
patrol  to  delay  the  march  of  a  regiment. 

Fourth.— Much  of  the  patrolling  and  marching 
of  flanking  detachments  across  country  is  exhaust- 
ing and  wears  out  troops.  This  should  be  reduced  to 
the  minimum  consistent  with  efficiency — not  only  in 
advance  guards,  but  everywhere. 

But  efficiency  requires  that  patrols  be  sent 
wherever  information  may  be  obtained  or  a  possible 
danger  lurks.  As  previously  stated,  never  send  a 
large  body  of  troops  to  gain  information  where  a 
patrol  can  do  as  well. 

The  greatest  element  in  controlling  the  forma- 
tion and  method  of  conducting  an  advance  or  rear 
guard  is  your  ' 'mission. "  What  is  the  object  of  the 
march?  What  does  the  commander  expect  and 
want  of  you?  How  can  you  best  accomplish  this? 
If  you  use  good  sense  to  accomplish  your  mission, 
and  bear  in  mind  the  foregoing  principles,  you  will 


—21— 

be  correct,  whether  it  agrees  with  the  normal  forma- 
tion or  not.  If  you  blindly  follow  a  normal  forma- 
tion, the  chances  are  you  will  be  wrong. 

-  The  carrying  out  of  your  mission  must  control 
the  application  of  the  other  principles.  To  illustrate: 
The  enemy  is  in  retreat;  you  are  superior  to  him;  it 
is  important  to  prevent  his  escape.  It  may  be  as- 
sumed in  such  a  case  that  there  is  little  danger  of 
his  turning  about  and  attacking  you,  so  that  for  pro- 
tection the  advance  guard  would  be  relatively  small. 
But  what  is  the  mission  of  the  advance  guard  in  this 
case?  Evidently  to  overtake  the  enemy,  then  hold 
him  fast  until  the  main  body  can  come  up  and  com- 
plete his  ruin.  A  relatively  weak  advance  guard 
would  answer  for  protection,  but  the  enemy  could 
quickly  throw  it  off  and  continue  on  his  way.  Hence, 
in  such  a  case  the  advance  guard  would  be  strong. 

In  determining  the  size  of  the  advance  guard 
keep  clearly  in  mind  your  mission  and  the  conditions 
surrounding  your  problem.  As  shown  above,  in  a 
pursuit  it  will  be  relatively  large.  Racing  for  the 
possession  of  some  important  point  would  call  for  a 
strong  advance  guard.  Your  column  is  one  of  a 
number  of  parallel  columns  marching  to  attack.  The 
advance  guard  would  be  relatively  very  small  for 
the  commander  of  the  column  should  keep  his  men 
in  his  own  hand  and  control  their  deployment  and 
entry  into  action. 

If  the  country  through  which  you  are  marching 
is  hostile  the  advance  guard  must  be  larger  than  if 
the  country  is  friendly.  The  inhabitants  will  help 
you  in  one  case  by  giving  information  and  will  do 
nothing  to  injure  you.  In  the  other  they  will  not 
give  you  much  information,  will  help  the  enemy  as 
far  as  possible,  and  surprises  will  be  much  more 
likely. 

In  making  the  detail  for  an  advance  guard  avoid 


—22— 

breaking  units,  i.e.,  if  three  companies  are  found 
necessary  it  is  generally  better  to  send  the  whole 
battalion;  where  two  battalions  are  needed,  let  the 
regiment  go.  In  each  problem  you  must  consider 
carefully  your  mission  in  connection  with  the  prin- 
ciples that  govern  and  thus  determine  the  size  of  the 
advance  guard.  It  will  vary  from  one  twentieth  to 
one  third  of  the  whole  force. 

The  march  of  the  advance  guard: 

Let  us  first  leave  out  of  consideration  the  flanks 
and  look  only  to  our  front.  From  the  principle  enu- 
merated, patrols  must  seek  information  where 
practicable.  Our  leading  element  must  therefore 
be  a  patrol  or  as  generally  called,  a  point. 

Now  the  formation  of  the  advance  guard  is  in 
two  principal  bodies;  a  vanguard  and  a  reserve.  The 
first  is  subdivided  into  the  advance  party  which 
throws  out  the  patrol  or  point  and  the  support. 

With  small  bodies  of  troops,  however,  there  is 
no  necessity  for  a  reserve;  in  fact  it  is  better  to  dis- 
pense with  it.  The  object  of  the  formation  is  to  pre- 
vent any  body  of  troops  being  fired  into  at  close 
range  before  it  has  had  timely  warning  to  prepare. 
The  time  necessarily  depends  on  the  size  of  the  body. 

Our  leading  element  is  a  patrol.  It  is  in  open 
order  and  is  always  in  proper  formation  and  it  will 
be  the  first  to  strike  the  enemy.  Following  it  is  the 
advance  party  only  a  section  or  so  and  for  it  to 
deploy  is  a  question  of  but  an  instant.  The  support  is 
larger  and  so  on  to  the  rear  until  we  encounter  the 
main  body.  Each  body  in  front  must  afford  the  one 
next  in  rear  time  to  prepare. 

The  terrain  must  then  exercise  a  great  influence 
on  the  distances  separating  the  detachments.  In 
very  broken  or  rolling  country  they  naturally  could 
be  much  less  than  on  an  open  plain.  The  size  of  the 
command  makes  a  great  difference.  A  company  or 


—23— 

less  deploys  very  quickly,  there  is  little  of  plan 
necessary.  In  a  large  mixed  command  a  regular  plan 
of  action  should  be  formed,  and  the  larger  the  body 
the  more  time  it  takes. 

In  night  marches,  if  in  the  close  vicinity  of  the 
enemy  and  an  attack  is  contemplated  should  the 
enemy  be  met,  it  will  generally  be  found  that  dis- 
tances should  be  shorter.  Of  course,  such  marches 
are  made  with  great  caution  and  should  have  been 
carefully  planned.  Ordinarily,  on  such  marches, 
you  will  not  run  into  the  enemy  unless  you  intended 
in  that  case  to  push  him  vigorously.  If  this  is  what 
your  mission  calls  for,  you  must  be  prepared  to  do  it. 

Night  firing  is  comparatively  ineffective  and  the 
attackers  best  chance  of  success  is  generally  to  rush 
the  enemy  vigorously.  In  such  a  case,  then,  dis- 
tances would  be  reduced  considerably  from  what 
they  would  be  in  daylight.  Another  precaution  well 
to  take,  is  to  have  the  leading  elements  march  with 
bayonets  fixed. 

One  can  conceive  of  a  night  march  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  enemy  where  he  is  nevertheless  not  expected 
to  be  encountered  and  if  so  met  the  commander  in- 
tends to  fall  back  and  avoid  an  action.  The  advance 
guard  commander's  mission  is  very  different  from 
that  in  the  previous  case.  He  must  arrange  his 
force  very  differently.  Distances  will  be  increased 
and  care  taken  by  means  of  connecting  groups  to 
keep  his  whole  command  in  touch. 

No  rule  can  be  given.  Know  what  you  are  to 
do  and  why.  Study  the  best  way  to  do  it;  use  com- 
mon sense. 

Now  let  us  look  to  our  flanks. 

Here  is  where  a  normal  formation  finds  its  least 
application. 

The  object  of  flanking  groups  is  to  protect  your 
column  from  a  surprise  attack  from  a  flank.  To  at- 


—24— 

tain  this  object  you  must  have  timely  warning  of  the 
enemy's  presence  near  your  flank.  In  this  connec- 
tion, bear  in  mind  that  in  small  commands,  you  can 
generally  form  line  of  battle  from  a  column  in  less 
time  to  the  flank  than  you  can  to  the  front,  and 
that  fire  across  a  column  is  not  so  dangerous  as  fire 
in  prolongation  of  the  direction  of  march.  How  are 
we  to  get  this  needed  protection?  By  so  observing 
the  country  that  if  the  enemy  is  where  he  can  attack 
us  in  flank  we  will  know  it  in  time. 

In  this  connection  we  must  remember  that  mod- 
ern artillery  may  be  considered  as  effective  up  to 
3500  yards  and  its  fire  will  reach  very  much  farther 
than  this,  and  that  infantry  fire  is  effective  to  at 
least  1200  yards,  though  this  is  not  its  extreme 
range. 

The  measures  to  be  taken  to  gain  protection 
from  this  fire  will  be  very  varied.  Many  condi- 
tions enter  into  the  problem. 

With  very  large  mixed  commands,  as  a  division 
or  more,  there  will  be  troops  marching  on  parallel 
roads  with  cavalry  well  to  the  front  carefully  recon- 
noitering  the  country  so  that  no  enemy  dangerous  to 
this  command  could  well  escape  attention.  Protec- 
tion for  a  division  is  not  gained  by  searching  the 
country  150  yards  on  each  flank  but  it  must  be  had 
for  several  miles. 

It  takes  much  time  to  deploy  a  division  and  this 
should  be  done  before  the  enemy 's  artillery  is  within 
effective  range,  or  even  within  long  range. 

With  smaller  mixed  commands,  as  about  a 
brigade  of  infantry,  with  some  cavalry  and  artillery, 
the  distances  on  the  road  and  the  formation  of  the 
infantry  of  the  advance  guard  should  be  as  previously 
shown,  Scouting  to  the  flanks  will  generally  be 
done  by  the  cavalry.  This  reconnaissance  must 
generally  extend  to  over  two  miles,  at  least,  if  the 


—25— 

country  on  the  flanks  is  at  all  favorable  to  an  attack 
from  that  direction  and  the  general  situation  is  such 
as  to  make  it  fairly  possible  that  the  enemy  could  be 
there. 

Where  if  the  enemy  is  met  he  will  probably  be 
in  force  and  have  artillery,  and  you  have  no  mounted 
troops  your  problem  is  a  hard  one.  The  reconnais- 
sance must  be  made.  Infantry  can  make  it  but 
slowly.  Cavalry  is  almost  indispensable  in  such 
work. 

Where  the  situation  is  such  as  to  make  an  at- 
tack from  a  flank  probable,  as  where  you  know  he  is 
on  a  road  approximately  at  right  angles  to  that  fol- 
lowed by  yourself,  a  flank  guard  is  generally  the 
solution,  provided  there  is  a  suitable  road  for  it  not 
over  a  mile  away.  This,  while  not  called  a  part  of 
the  advance  guard  serves  the  same  purpose.  In  com- 
mands not  greater  than  a  brigade  these  detachments 
are  justified  only  by  necessity.  A  brigade  of  in- 
fantry without  cavalry  will  find  much  more  necessity 
for  them  than  where  cavalry  can  do  proper  recon- 
naissance. 

Even  a  small  force  of  efficient  cavalry  can,  in 
most  cases,  obviate  the  necessity  for  flank  guards  of 
any  size. 

But  it  is  not  of  armies  or  even  of  divisions  that  I 
wish  to  talk  today,  but  of  small  commands. 

The  general  principles  are  the  same.  But  with- 
out artillery  and  having  only  a  small  force,  your  pro- 
tection to  a  flank  does  not  have  to  extend  so  far. 

In  most  cases  your  danger  will  be  from  about 
equal  forces.  If  you  meet  a  large  force  with  artil- 
lery, you  probably  can  do  nothing  but  get  away  as 
best  you  can. 

As  commander  of  a  small  force,  say  a  battalion 
or  a  regiment  of  infantry,  you  must,  if  in  the  vicinity 
of  an  enemy,  protect  yourself  from  flank  surprise 


—26— 

attacks.     The  distance  and  manner  will  vary  accord- 
ing to  the  terrain. 

Take  a  march,  first  along  a   ridge   road  with  a 
valley  close  to  one  side  as  shown  in  cross  section. 


Abroad. 


Distance  from  A,  across  valley,  a  mile  or  more. 
Suppose  the  valley  to  be  open  field,  affording  little  or 
no  cover  from  view. 

Would  you  send  a  patrol  to  the  right?  Evidently 
not,  for  you  can  see  as  much  from  the  road  as  150 
yards  away  from  it. 

But  how  about  the  left?  You  cannot  see  far 
enough  in  that  direction  from  the  road.  Patrols 
must  be  sent  out  to  a  distance  great  enough  to  secure 
you  from  surprise. 

Suppose  that  on  the  right,  while  the  valley  is 
generally  open,  there  are  some  features  that  would 
conceal  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy.  Patrols 
must  be  sent  there  in  ample  time  to  make  sure  you 
do  not  meet  an  unpleasant  surprise.  But  to  have  a 
patrol  march  along  parallel  to  the  column  would  be 
unnecessary.  It  would  be  exhausting  to  the  men 
and  probably  delay  your  march.  Even  on  the  left 
there  might  be  a  hill,  or  some  point,  from  which  a 
clear  view  of  the  country  on  that  side  could  be 
observed.  Sending  a  patrol  there  with  field  glasses 
will  often  render  unnecessary  a  flanking  detach- 


—27— 

ment.  The  frequent  sending  of  patrols  to  prom- 
inent points  to  the  flanks  will  often  answer 
every  purpose.  They  should  hurry  out  from  near 
the  head  of  the  column  and  rejoin  at  the  tail. 

Again,  the  march  may  be  through  country  that 
affords  cover  in  every  direction  for  an  enemy.  There 
will  be  cases  in  which  the  best  solution  will  be  a  line 
of  men  at  intervals  of  from  20  to  50  yards,  or  even 
more,  marching  ahead  of  the  command.  This  last 
case  would  be  rare. 

There  will  be  cases,  as  for  instance  a  road  in  the 
bottom  of  a  narrow  valley,  where  flanking  groups 
will  probably  have  to  march  parallel  with  the  column. 
In  such  cases  it  is  well  to  relieve  them  often  or  your 
march  will  be  delayed. 

As  this  is  only  a  short  talk  and  not  a  book  on  the 
subject,  more  examples  are  not  necessary.  I  want 
only  to  illustrate  the  principle  that  you  must  adapt 
your  measures  to  the  problem  presented;  do  not 
follow  a  fixed  formation. 

As  to  the  size  of  these  flanking  detachments, 
they  will  vary  from  two  men  to  a  considerable  force. 
If  the  patrol  remains  practically  in  sight  of  the 
command,  two  men  will  probably  answer  as  well  as 
more.  But  if  the  flanking  group  is  to  be  at  some 
distance  with,  say  an  obstacle  of  some  kind  inter- 
vening, it  should  be  much  larger.  For  instance,  if 
your  road  runs  nearly  parallel  with  a  railroad,  about 
600  yards  distant  with  some  thick  country  between 
them,  it  would  be  well  to  send  a  party  varying  from 
a  squad  up,  according  to  size  of  command,  to  march 
along  the  railroad. 

A  problem  worked  out  at  one  of  our  maneuvers 
illustrates  the  point.  A  regiment  of  infantry  was 
sent  along  a  road  which  led  through  a  defile  about 
3,000  yards  long.  The  west  side  was  nearly  precipi- 
tous and  the  road  was  from  20  to  40  feet  below  the 


—28— 

plateau  on  this  side.  The  problem  was  solved  on 
different  days  by  different  regiments. 

The  first  marched  through  in  the  normal  forma- 
tion with  a  battalion  in  advance  guard  and  flanking 
patrols  out  about  150  yards. 

The  enemy,  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  had  dis- 
mounted and  held  position  on  the  edge  of  the  plateau 
looking  down  into  the  defile  about  its  middle.  The 
cavalry  had  out  its  combat  patrol  to  its  left  which 
promptly  captured  the  flankers  of  the  infantry.  The 
enemy  then  waited  until  the  main  body  was  opposite 
to  them  and  then  poured  in  a  rapid  fire  at  very  short 
range. 

A  Wisconsin  regiment  solved  it  differently.  In- 
stead of  a  patrol  of  three  men  they  sent  a  company 
to  the  right  and  much  farther  out.  The  combat 
patrol  of  the  cavalry  was  captured  and  the  company 
gained  the  left  rear  of  the  squadron  and  threatened 
the  led  horses.  The  cavalry  now  had  other  work  cut 
out  for  it  than  shooting  up  the  column.  Another 
precaution  taken  by  this  regiment  is  worthy  of  note. 
The  advance  guard  marched  with  much  greater  dis- 
tances than  the  normal  and  there  was  a  distance  of 
several  hundred  yards  between  the  second  and  third 
battalions.  If  attacked  in  flank  by  a  small  force,  not 
more  than  one  battalion  would  be  involved  and  either 
the  leading  battalion  (advance  guard)  would  be 
emerging  and  able  to  take  in  flank  the  attacking 
force,  or  the  last  one  not  yet  in  the  defile  could  take 
the  same  action  on  the  other  flank. 

The  first  solution  followed  a  form,  the  second 
tried  to  adapt  means  to  the  end  desired.  Which  is 
the  better? 

In  war  nearly  every  time  you  get  command  of 
the  advance  guard,  your  problem  will  present  new 
phases,  new  conditions  to  be  met. 

In  every  case  ask  yourself  the  questions:    Can 


—29— 

the  enemy  make  a  surprise  attack  on  me?  Are  my 
arrangements  such  as  to  unnecessarily  exhaust  my 
men?  Have  I  scattered  my  command  too  much  (by 
flank  movements,  etc.)?  If  you  can  give  a  satisfac- 
tory answer  to  these  questions  your  dispositions  are 
correct. 

Remember  large  bodies  of  troops  are  hard  to 
hide  in  ordinary  terrain. 

Patrols  sent  to  the  flanks  from  small  infantry 
columns  are  apt  to  delay  the  march  and  be  less 
effective  than  cavalry.  But  if  you  have  no  cavalry, 
infantry  must  be  used. 

One  course  is  possibly  open  to  the  infantry.  To 
each  regiment  of  infantry  is  now  attached  20 
mounted  orderlies.  The  battalion  staff  officers  are 
mounted.  Cannot  these  men  be  trained  so  that  when 
the  regiment  is  operating  alone  they  can  be  utilized 
for  this  work?  All  of  them  are  certainly  not  neces- 
sary for  orderlies  at  such  a  time. 

Rear  Guards 

These  are  often  described  as  an  advance  guard 
reversed.  As  far  as  formation  and  distribution  are 
concerned  this  is  nearly  correct.  Most  of  what  I 
have  already  said  applies. 

There  are  a  few  special  points  I  wish  to  call  to 
your  attention  that  pertain  to  rear  guards  and  not  to 
advance. 

Your  mission  is  generally  very  different.  You 
are  not  seeking  a  combat,  but  are  trying  to  avoid  one 
for  the  main  body. 

The  great  danger  of  a  retreat  is  that  it  may 
become  a  rout.  This  the  rear  guard  must  prevent. 
It  must  not  allow  the  main  body  to  be  crowded. 
Particularly  is  this  the  case  after  a  lost  battle.  The 
pursuer  must  push  his  success  to  the  utmost  if 
he  is  to  reap  the  full  fruit  of  his  victory.  The  de- 


—30— 

feated  command  is  more  or  less  disorganized  and  in 
confusion.  If  it  can  gain  time  to  get  in  shape  un- 
molested it  cannot  be  run  over,  but  it  is  practically 
helpless  at  first.  The  rear  guard  must  gain  the 
necessary  time. 

Another  case— suppose  the  retreat  is  not  the 
result  of  a  defeat,  but  rather  because  the  command 
is  so  weak  that  a  fight  must  result  in  a  defeat.  This 
retreat,  if  long  and  crowded,  will  generally  de- 
generate into  a  rout,  and  cause  great  injury  to  the 
command.  The  enemy  wants,  of  course,  to  force  a 
fight. 

The  rear  guard  must  so  delay  the  enemy  in  both 
cases  as  to  fully  serve  his  own  command. 

The  troops  selected  for  this  duty  should  be  the 
best  available.  Cavalry  and  artillery  are  very  essen- 
tial in  large  commands. 

The  manuals  give  all  these  points,  and  all  that  I 
have  said  as  to  the  applicabilities  of  the  normal 
formation  in  the  case  of  the  advance  guard  applies 
equally  here. 

There  is  one  point  that  is  essential  to  keep  in 
mind:  You  do  not  fight  from  choice,  but  from 
necessity  to  gain  time  and  thus  fulfill  your  mission. 

In  selecting  a  position  in  which  to  fight  a  delay- 
ing action,  one  requirement  must  be  considered  not 
ordinarily  entering  into  the  problem  when  an  advance 
guard  combat  is  entered  into,  and  that  is,  ease  of 
getting  away. 

A  strong  defensive  position  must  be  selected  as 
explained  in  the  books.  But  you  are  going  to  retreat 
from  it;  you  are  not  going  to  fight  to  a  finish.  This 
involves  a  new  consideration. 

If  you  become  closely  engaged  you  can  only 
break  off  with  great  difficulty  unless  the  ground  is 
favorable.  Such  ground  should  be  selected  where 
practicable.  For  example,  in  rolling  country  you  can 


—31— 

often  find  a  ridge  where  you  can  remain  until  vhe 
enemy  is  within  a  few  hundred  yards  and  as  soon  as 
you  drop  to  the  rear  you  will  be  concealed  until  he 
gets  to  where  you  were,  and  even  then  you  may  be 
under  cover  from  that  position. 

Now  a  word  to  the  officer  who  makes  the  detail 
of  an  advance  or  rear  guard.  Give  your  order  so 
that  the  advance  or  rear  guard  commander  can  in- 
telligently carry  it  out.  If  he  knows  the  situation 
fully  he  can  determine  his  mission  and  know  what 
to  do. 

You  can  generally  do  no  better  than  follow  the 
rules  given  in  the  Field  Service  Regulations  as  to 
general  form. 

First.  — Tell  him  what  is  known  of  the  enemy 
and  of  other  bodies  of  our  own  troops. 

Second. —Your  plan  or  intentions  in  a  general 
way,  but  fully  enough  that  he  can  appreciate  his 
mission. 

Third. —Details  as  to  the  march— i.e.,  route, 
distance  from  main  body,  and  directions  as  to  special 
reconnaissance  you  want  him  to  make.  In  this 
latter,  do  not  encroach  too  much  on  his  liberty  of 
action. 

When  to  relieve  the  advance  guard?  The  gen- 
eral rule  in  small  commands  is  in  the  morning;  that 
is,  the  advance  guard  of  today  will  furnish  the 
outpost  tonight  and  stand  relieved  when  the  new 
advance  guard  marches  through  the  outpost  line 
next  morning.  This  does  not  put  excessive  labor  on 
the  advance  guard.  The  reserve,  or  support  if  you 
have  no  reserve,  has  not  had  any  harder  time  on  the 
march,  probably,  than  the  main  body;  at  night  they 
take  all  the  sentry  work  and  patrolling,  the  leading 
troops  during  the  day  being  the  reserve  of  the  out- 
post at  night. 

The  reason  for  this  is— they  are  thoroughly  fa- 


—32— 

miliar  with  the  situation  and  have  seen  the  country 
farther  forward  and  it  avoids  a  countermarch  for 
them  when  relieved. 

In  a  retreat  you  generally  make  the  relief  at 
night.  A  new  outpost  is  detailed,  the  rear  guard 
providing  protection  until  it  is  in  place.  The  rear 
guard  then  marches  through  to  the  rear  and  stands 
.  relieved;  The  outpost  is  the  rear  guard  next  day,  if 
the  retreat  is  continued.  The  reason  being  the  same 
in  principle  as  in  the  above  case. 

In  large  commands  as  a  division,  the  covering 
detachment  is  not  relieved  daily,  often  remaining 
out  for  a  week  or  ten  days. 

Let  us  now  take  the  two-inch  map  of  Fort  Leav- 
en worth  and  vicinity  and  try  a  simple  problem. 

Problem 

General    Situation: 

The  Missouri  river  forms  the  boundary  between 
two  hostile  states  whose  main  armies  are  operating 
about  thirty  miles  south  of  Leavenworth. 

The  Western  Army  occupies  Leavenworth,  with 
a  garrison  of  two  or  three  thousand  troops,  and  is 
sending  small  parties  into  nearby  eastern  territory 
seizing  supplies  and  horses. 

The  Eastern  Army  has  ordered  a  force  to  Platte 
City  to  clear  this  country  of  hostile  raiders.  This 
force,  October  1st,  is  marching  north  on  the  east  side 
of  the  Platte. 

Special    Situation: 

On  the  hill  south  of  76  the  commander  of  the 
Eastern  force  learns  that  there  are  about  seventy- 
five  hostile  troops  east  of  the  Missouri  river  and  that 
they  are  somewhere  between  Tracy  and  Farley.  He 
thereupon  orders  Company  A,  1st  Infantry,  to  cross 
the  Platte  on  the  bridge  at  72  and  defeat  and  drive 


—33— 

away  this  hostile  company  and  rejoin  at  Platte  City. 

Let  us  briefly  state  a  method  of  conducting  this 
company's  march  and  then  examine  it  more  closely. 
We  will  assume  our  company  of  full  war  strength  — 
with  four  squads  in  the  first  section. 

From  the  hill  south  of  76  and  from  the  map  a 
good  idea  of  the  country  is  formed  by  all  the  officers 
of  the  company. 

The  company  quits  the  column  at  76  and  here 
halts  while  the  captain  details  the  leading  section  as 
the  advance  guard  and  gives  its  commander  his 
orders. 

The  advance  guard  then  moves  out  as  follows: 

In  the  lead  are  four  men  and  the  corporal  of  the 
first  squad,  two  hundred  yards  behind  them  remain- 
ing three  men  of  the  first  squad,  two  hundreds  yards 
further  back  the  front  rank  of  the  second  squad,  two 
hundred  and  fifty  yards  further  the  remainder  of  the 
advance  guard,  and  six  hundred  yards  in  rear,  the 
main  body.  It  is  recommended  to  the  reader  to 
make  a  sketch  of  the  formation. 

The  column  moves  directly  to  Farley,  and  no 
enemy  is  found.  When  the  leading  patrol  reaches 
Farley  the  place  is  examined  to  see  if  any  of  the 
enemy  are  there.  Then  one  man  moves  west  until 
he  can  see  along  the  road  42—32.  Nothing  being 
seen,  he  signals  back  to  the  patrol  at  Farley  and  all 
five  of  the  men  go  up  on  the  bluff  and  proceed  north 
across  country,  really  becoming  a  left  flank  patrol. 

The  second  group  and  column  would  halt  while 
Farley  was  being  examined  and  until  the  patrol 
moves  to  the  bluff.  The  leading  patrol  having  gained 
the  bluff,  the  march  is  resumed.  The  second  patrol 
now  being  the  point,  would  move  from  44  to  46  and 
would  there  turn  off  to  the  right  and  become  a  right 
flank  patrol,  and  the  third  group  would  now  become 
the  point  and  would  proceed  along  the  48—50  road. 


—34— 

The  other  parts  of  the  column  following  in  the  same 
order  as  before. 

Let  us  now  follow  our  left  patrol. 

The  corporal  and  his  four  men  having  reached 
the  high  ground  near  975  and  having  examined  the 
ground  there,  proceed  north  on  the  ridge  in  open 
formation  until  they  reach  the  knoll  unmarked.  Here 
they  divide.  The  corporal  sends  two  men  to  hill  960 
thence  to  proceed  north  to  Cannon— 900  hill — Mayo— 
to  west  of  hill  900  near  50.  With  the  two  other  men 
he  goes  to  1000 — 860— the  high  ground  north  follow- 
ing along  near  the  ridge  to  930,  north  to  950,  to  hill 
960  east  of  Alexander  on  the  14—50  road.  These 
patrols  see  nothing  of  the  enemy  thus  far,  but  shortly 
after  passing  the  points  designated,  the  point  on  the 
road  is  fired  into,  and  a  few  minutes  later  the  com- 
pany is  seen  to  be  attacking  a  force  of  the  enemy 
near  Baldwin. 

The  corporal  now  assembles  his  men  and  disposes 
them  so  as  to  cover  the  company's  left  flank  and  de- 
tect any  movement  of  the  enemy  in  that  direction. 

The  second  patrol  after  turning  east  at  46  would 
increase  its  pace,  follow  the  road  for  about  three 
hundred  yards,  and  then  to  hill  930,  along  the  bluff, 
past  Peter's  to  48,  on  the  way  observing  carefully 
the  country  north  of  the  road  48—60,  and  then  rejoin 
the  column.  Just  before  reaching  48,  two  men  would 
be  hurried  forward  (fast  walk)  to  leave  the  road  be- 
tween Robket  and  Baker  and  to  go  to  the  edge  of 
the  bluff  and  follow  along  the  ravine  back  to  the  road 
and  join  the  column.  After  crossing  the  ravine  near 
Baker  no  right  flank  patrol  would  be  necessary  until 
near  50;  but  here  the  enemy  is  struck  and  the  com- 
bat ensues. 

There  is  no  necessity  in  following  in  detail  the 
march  of  the  parts  on  the  road,  except  to  state  that 
whenever  a  patrol  is  sent  out  from  a  leading  element, 


—35— 

men  are  sent  forward  to  replace  them.  If  the  de- 
taching of  the  patrol  can  be  foreseen  men  should  be 
present  in  ample  time  or  even  should  be  started  out 
with  the  leading  elements. 

Let  us  now  see  whether  the  above  outline 
answers  the  purpose. 

First— will  it  protect  the  main  body  from  fire 
from  the  front  at  short  range?  The  ground  the  com- 
pany must  first  cross  is  open  and  an  enemy  at  Farley 
or  on  the  hill  nearby  would  have  a  clear  field  of  fire 
for  the  full  range  of  their  rifles.  Have  we  protected 
against  this  at  the  beginning?  From  the  leading 
patrol  to  the  head  of  the  main  body  is  1,250  yards 
and  our  leading  patrol  should  see  the  enemy  at  least 
a  few  yards  before  reaching  him.  Infantry  fire  at  a 
range  of  over  thirteen  hundred  yards  at  a  target  of 
that  size  would  not  be  very  effective  in  the  first  few 
seconds  and  three  sections  could  deploy  quickly. 
Only  patrols,  always  assumed  to  be  in  open  order, 
precede  the  main  body  of  the  advance  guard.  It  is 
650  yards  from  the  leading  patrol  to  this  body,  only 
two  and  a  half  squads  in  strength.  It  seems,  then, 
that  the  requirement  is  fulfilled  for  this  part  of  our 
march. 

Turning  at  Farley  toward  46,  one  patrol  less  is  in 
front  and  the  distance  is  only  1,050  yards  from 
leading  patrol  to  main  body.  But  there  is  a  patrol 
on  the  bluff  and  it  is  fairly  certain  that  no  enemy  is 
south  of  46  between  the  bluff  and  the  river.  North 
of  46  the  distance  is  reduced  to  850  yards.  But  the 
country  is  broken  and  rough  and  that  will  be  ample 
distance  in  such  terrain.  When  places  occur  where 
the  field  of  fire  from  the  front  would  be  too  open  and 
long,  the  main  body  could  hold  back,  closing  up  again 
on  the  leading  elements  where  the  terrain  was  of  a 
different  character.  Delays  due  to  flanking  patrols 
will  give  opportunity  for  this  without  hurrying. 


—36— 

As  to  the  second  requirement  time  is  needed  to 
put  the  main  body  properly  into  the  fight.  In  so 
small  a  command  this  condition  is  generally  fulfilled 
when  the  first  requirement  is  met. 

Let  us  look  at  the  flank  protection.  We  have 
used  none  until  reaching  Farley.  Was  any  necessary? 

According  to  the  map  the  country  southwest  of 
the  road  is  flat  and  open  and  could  be  seen  from  the 
hill  and  from  the  road.  To  the  northeast  slightly 
more  cover  for  an  enemy  is  available,  but  not  much 
and  the  enemy  would  hardly  put  himself  in  such  a 
pocket,  with  our  main  command  to  his  east  and  this 
company  making  for  Farley.  He  would  scarcely  be 
so  obliging. 

From  Farley  north,  on  the  west  of  the  road,  the 
country  is  covered  for  about  1,000  yards  as  efficiently 
as  can  be  done  with  so  small  a  force.  The  distance 
of  1,000  yards  is  sufficient  for  a  company's  protection, 
knowing,  as  they  do,  the  small  size  of  the  enemy's 
force  in  the  neighborhood.  Then  they  are  in  friendly 
territory;  farmhouses  are  numerous  and  information 
more  easily  obtained.  Had  this  been  hostile  country, 
I  would  recommend  increasing  this  patrol  to  a  squad 
so  as  to  have  a  central  group. 

On  the  other  flank  we  have  less  patrolling,  for 
we  have  considered  the  improbability  of  an  enemy 
pocketing  himself  against  an  unfordable  river  with 
the  main  body  of  our  force  able  to  shoot  into  him 
across  the  river  and  our  company  threatening  to  cut 
him  off  from  home.  We  also  consider  the  friendliness 
of  the  inhabitants  as  before.  Still  the  enemy  might 
not  know  of  our  main  body  and  might  be  caught  in 
this  bad  situation,  so  those  places  that  would  conceal 
him  from  view  should  be  examined.  This  has  been 
done.  If  the  patrols  on  this  flank  are  properly 
conducted,  our  object  will  be  attained. 


—37— 

I  think  it  is  clear  that  we  have  not  used  too  many 
for  this  exhausting  work. 

Now  suppose  that  in  this  problem  there  was  a 
battalion  detached,  instead  of  a  company,  and  the 
enemy  was  two  or  three  companies.  What  changes 
would  you  make? 

My  answer  would  be,  simply  to  consider  the 
company  already  discussed  as  the  advance  guard, 
form  it  exactly  as  we  have  and  have  the  main  body 
(three  companies)  follow  600  yards  in  rear  as  main 
body.  One  modification  to  be  made  would  be  to 
detach  another  patrol  from  the  main  body  of  the 
advance  guard  to  follow  between  the  two  parts  of  the 
first  one  through  the  country  west  of  the  road. 

Suppose  it  was  a  regiment  detached  against  two 
battalions.  Simply  have  the  other  two  battalions 
follow  the  first  as  main  body  at  from  600  to  800 
yards.  In  this  case  there  should  be  a  squad  on  the 
left  after  reaching  Farley  and  another  squad  follow- 
ing as  second  patrol. 

We  now  have  all  the  parts  of  an  advance  guard. 
The  leading  company  is  the  vanguard,  its  first  sec- 
tion the  advance  party.  The  other  three  companies 
of  this  battalion  the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard. 

As  the  size  of  the  command  increases  more  pro- 
tection, both  on  the  flank  and  front,  is  necessary, 
and  this  solution  provides  for  it. 

In  solving  a  rear  guard  problem  you  apply  the 
same  method,  remembering  that  your  mission  is  very 
different. 

I  have  not  gone  into  the  details  as  to  connecting 
files  and  how  the  patrols  are  formed  and  led— that  is 
assumed  to  be  done  correctly— but  a  study  of  this 
problem  will  show  the  importance  of  carefully  in- 
structing our  men  in  patrolling. 

The  turning  off  of  the  leading  patrols,  as  done  in 


—38— 

this  case,  is  of  course  exceptional  in  a  way.  From 
the  hill  and  the  map  assumed  to  be  had,  it  should  be 
foreseen  that  these  patrols  would  be  needed,  and 
using  them  in  this  way  gave  additional  security  to 
the  march  during  a  critical  period  and  saved  delay 
later.  Without  them,  distance  must  have  been  in- 
creased for  this  part  of  our  march.  Each  problem 
will  present  its  own  special  features.  This  same  one 
may  never  occur  to  you,  but  others  will.  Do  not  try 
to  follow  a  normal  formation,  but  adopt  the  means 
necessary  in  the  particular  case  to  meet  the  con- 
ditions. 

Outposts 

The  object  of  an  outpost  is  to  protect  a  body  of 
troops  while  in  camp  or  bivouac  from  surprise,  to 
prevent  an  attack  being  delivered  against  it  before 
it  has  had  time  to  form  up.  There  is  an  exceptional 
case  where  a  command  has  only  one  object— to  re- 
treat. In  that  case  the  outpost  must  give  warning 
and  hold  back  the  enemy  until  the  command  can  get 
in  march. 

What  is  the  correct  formation  for  an  outpost? 
The  answer  appears  plain.  Any  formation  that  se- 
cures the  object  aimed  at  most  efficiently  with  the 
fewest  men,  giving  unbroken  rest  to  the  remainder 
of  the  troops.  In  no  part  of  tactics  does  a  normal 
formation  so  little  apply  as  in  outposts. 

In  determining  the  outpost  strength  and  dis- 
positions we  must  consider,  as  in  all  other  covering 
detachments,  the  nature  of  the  terrain,  probable 
direction  of  attack,  range  of  weapons,  country— 
hostile  or  friendly— supposed  proximity  of  the 
enemy,  etc. 

Let  us  look  at  the  bearing  of  some  of  these 
conditions  on  our  problem. 

In  a  country  like  most  of  the  United  States,  with 


—39— 

its  telephones  and  telegraph  and  its  loyal  and  in- 
telligent population,  we  can  safely  count  on  little 
valuable  information  being  given  hostile  troops,  and 
on  the  other  hand  we  can  count  on  the  people  report- 
ing movements  of  the  enemy  to  friendly  troops. 

There  will  be  many  cases  in  which  foolish  or 
stupid  people  will  give  the  enemy  valuable  informa- 
tion, and  at  times  information  will  not  be  sent  to 
friendly  troops,  and  small  detachments  can  often 
evade  observation. 

Accepting  the  above  we  see  that  we  cannot  dis- 
pense with  covering  detachments,  even  in  friendly 
territory,  but  that  the  danger  of  surprise  is  less. 

When  the  hostile  main  body  is  a  day's  march  or 
more  away  we  can  feel  certain  that  only  small  bodies 
of  infantry  and  cavalry  need  be  feared.  Large 
bodies  of  infantry  and  artillery  do  not  move  far  in  a 
night,  if  at  all,  and  concealment  is  very  unlikely. 

The  most  important  consideration,  however,  is 
the  nature  of  the  enemy.  If  he  has  recently  been 
defeated  and  you  are  pursuing,  you  do  not  require  as 
strong  an  outpost  as  when  conditions  are  reversed. 
With  an  aggressive,  active  enemy,  your  protection 
must  be  greater  than  with  an  enemy  who  seems  to 
be  strictly  on  the  defensive. 

Of  course  outpost  dispositions  must  vary  with 
the  size  of  your  command.  A  company  or  less 
bivouacking  in  a  state  of  readiness  to  form  for  action 
does  not  require  an  elaborate  outpost— two  or  three 
sentinels  and  a  patrol  or  two  are  ample.  A  brigade 
or  more  must  have  considerable  time  to  form  for 
action. 

The  relative  strength  of  the  outpost  is  therefore 
influenced  by  many  conditions;  it  will  vary  within 
wide  limits.  One  twelfth  of  the  troops  at  one  time 
may  be  large;  at  another,  one  third  may  be  scarcely 
enough. 


—40— 

The  placing  of  troops  on  outpost  follows  the 
general  rules  as  given  in  advance  and  rear  guards. 
Their  distance  from  the  main  body  must  be  sufficient 
to  keep  the  main  body  from  being  fired  into  before  it 
is  in  proper  formation.  If  the  attacker  will  probably 
open  with  artillery,  the  distance  must  be  greater 
than  if  only  musketry  fire  is  to  be  expected.  The 
size  of  the  main  body,  hence  the  time  required  to 
form,  must  have  an  influence.  The  stronger  the 
outpost  and  the  position  it  occupies  the  longer  it  can 
probably  delay  the  enemy  and  keep  him  from  closing 
in  to  effective  range. 

In  this  connection,  we  must  consider  where  we 
propose  to  make  our  stand  if  attacked.  If  the  de- 
fense is  to  be  made  in  the  position  occupied  by  the 
main  body,  less  time  and  distance  will  generally  be 
required  than  if  a  position  forward  of  that  is  to  be 
taken. 

When  we  come  to  placing  our  men  on  outpost  we 
must  bear  in  mind  that  we  must  early  learn  of  the 
approach  of  the  enemy  in  order  that  timely  warning 
may  be  given,  and  that  the  enemy  may  be  met  by  no 
troops  not  in  formation  for  such  a  meeting.  As  in 
advance  guard  formation  a  patrol  or  its  equivalent 
must  be  the  first  to  meet  the  enemy,  and  succeeding 
troops  must  be  able  to  form  before  he  can  reach 
them.  A  squad  deploys  very  quickly. 

The  time  of  day  and  weather  conditions  must  be 
considered.  If  the  weather  is  clear,  in  an  open 
country,  movements  of  the  enemy  can  be  seen  much 
farther  than  when  conditions  are  different.  Natur- 
ally, if  you  can  see  for  a  mile  or  more  from  your 
advanced  positions,  the  latter  need  not  be  as  far 
from  the  main  body  as  when  the  enemy  can  approach 
much  closer  before  being  seen. 

When  it  comes  to  dividing  up  the  troops  on  out- 
post, the  terrain  is  an  important  element. 


—41— 

There  are  often  portions  of  your  front  over 
which  the  enemy  cannot  advance,  as,  for  example,  a 
swamp  or  very  thick  jungle,  etc.  There  are  other 
portions  which,  while  it  is  possible  for  the  enemy  to 
cross  them,  it  is  extremely  unlikely  that  he  will. 
Such  parts  of  your  front  should  not  receive  the  same 
attention  as  the  others.  Here  an  occasional  patrol 
will  answer  every  purpose.  At  night  marching 
troops  must  generally  keep  to  the  roads.  A  large 
force  cannot  move  far  ^across  rough  country  in  the 
night  and  be  in  condition  to  accomplish  much  against 
an  alert  enemy.  In  exceptional  country  it  can  be 
done,  but  generally  the  roads  are  the  important 
points  to  watch,  especially  when  cavalry  is  to  be 
feared.  Portions  of  your  front  that  the  enemy  can 
possibly  cross,  though  he  is  not  likely  to  do  so,  must 
not  be  neglected;  a  few  men,  or  often  better,  .patrols 
to  watch  it,  should  be  provided.  Apportion  your 
men  according  to  requirements,  taking  full  advantage 
of  the  ground  to  economize  strength. 

You  have  just  finished  the  study  of  '  'Security 
and  Information, "  therefore  no  attempt  is  made  to 
go  into  details  of  formation  or  cover  all  points,  but 
merely  to  point  out  some  of  the  more  important  fea- 
tures that  are  often  overlooked.  It  is  so  much  easier 
always  to  follow  a  normal  formation  that  too  many 
do  so,  overlooking  the  fact  that  the  book  tells  you 
that  circumstances  and  conditions  make  variations  in 
the  normal  form.  It  may  be  said  that  the  normal 
formation  is  'decidedly  exceptional  in  practice. 

In  solving  your  problem  determine  your  "mis- 
sion"; then  consider  carefully  what  you  know  of  the 
enemy;  the  distance  necessary  to  hold  him  off;  de- 
termine his  probable  course  of  action;  then  consider 
the  ground  in  your  front;  what  portions  must  be 
strongly  held;  what  portions  can  be  ignored;  then  if 
you  are  to  detail  an  outpost  determine  the  number 


necessary  and  make  the  detail,  breaking  tactical 
units  as  little  as  possible.  If  you  are  detailed  with 
your  company  or  battalion  to  form  the  outpost,  after 
studying  the  question  as  before  divide  your  men  so 
as  bast  to  carry  out  your  mission.  A  reserve  of 
greater  or  less  strength,  according  to  circumstances, 
should  always  be  held  in  your  own  hands. 

After  you  have  decided  tentatively  on  your  dis- 
positions look  over  the  ground  carefully  and  study 
every  avenue  of  approach  for  the  enemy  and  ask 
yourself  if  your  dispositions  are  such  as  to  get  timely 
information  of  a  hostile  advance  by  any  of  these  and 
to  cause  the  necessary  delay  to  the  enemy,  then  ex- 
amine your  dispositions  and  see  if  you  are  using  no 
more  men  than  are  necessary  for  sentinels  and 
patrols.  If  your  answers  are  in  the  affirmative  you 
have  probably  solved  the  problem  correctly. 

Outposts  can  be  best  studied  by  considering  con- 
crete cases. 

Let  us  take  the  following  problem  on  the  two- 
inch  map  of  Fort  Leavenworth  and  vicinity: 

Problem 

A  Northern  army  is  at  Omaha,  a  Southern  army 
at  Kansas  City.  Country  shown  on  map  is  Southern. 
The  two  bridges  over  the  Missouri  river  near  Leav- 
enworth have  been  rendered  impassable. 

On  May  1st  the  2d  Battalion,  3d  Infantry,  of  the 
Southern  army  arrived  by  marching  from  Kansas 
City  to  hold  the  railroad  crossing  at  Beverly,  the  re- 
mainder of  the  brigade  to  which  this  battalion  be- 
longs is  to  follow  next  day.  These  troops  are  to 
cover  the  repair  of  the  bridges  and  protect  the  coun- 
try in  the  vicinity  from  raids. 

Major  A  in  command  of  the  2d  Battalion  arrives 
at  Beverly  at  3  p.m.,  and  here  learns  from  friendly 
inhabitants  and  spies  that  a  considerable  force  of  the 


—43— 

enemy  was  expected  to  reach  Atchison  (twenty-seven 
miles  north  of  Weston)  that  evening  and  that  small 
parties  of  hostile  troops  are  already  from  ten  to  twelve 
miles  south  of  Atchison. 
Weather  clear. 

Required  : 

1.  Major  A's  dispositions  for  the  night,  and  his 
reasons  therefor. 

Let  us  assume  that  Major  A  has  marched  his 
battalion  with  Company  E  as  advance  guard,  the 
other  companies  following  in  the  order  F,  G,  H. 

Major  A  is  at  Beverly  at  the  head  of  his  main 
body.  The  advance  guard  having  been  notified  to 
halt,  as  this  is  the  end  of  the  march,  would  promptly 
have  out  the  necessary  march  outpost  to  cover  the 
battalion  until  the  "halt  and  outpost"  order  was 
issued. 

Major  A's  mission  is  to  hold  Beverly  until  the 
brigade  arrives  tomorrow.  The  information  received 
convinces  him  that  he  cannot  be  attacked  during  the 
night  by  a  very  large  force,  but  that  detachments, 
probably  together,  equal  to  or  stronger  than  his  own 
are  within  striking  distance  and  may  attack. 

He  must  therefore  select  his  camp  and  post  his 
outpost  in  such  a  way  as  best  to  enable  him  to  carry 
out  his  mission. 

He  sees  at  once  that  to  protect  Beverly  he  must 
not  camp  there.  The  spur  at  Spinner  about  500 
yards  east  of  Beverly  commands  it  and  the  place 
could  not  be  held  with  an  enemy  of  about  equal 
strength  at  Spinner.  Conversely,  if  Major  A  holds 
Spinner  the  enemy  can  do  nothing  at  Beverly  until 
he  first  drives  away  Major  A's  command. 

This  spur  also  affords  a  good  defensive  position 
against  an  attack  by  the  enemy.  To  the  west  and 
northwest  is  an  open  plain  for  nearly  1,500  yards; 


—44— 

beyond  this  the  timber  is  too  dense  for  the  successful 
movement  of  troops.  To  the  north  and  northeast 
the  roads  are  well  controlled  and  a  fairly  good  field 
of  fire  is  afforded,  especially  to  the  east  and  to  the 
north  where  the  enemy  has  Bee  Creek  to  cross  in 
plain  view  at  effective  range. 

The  spur  north  of  this  one  does  not  afford  as 
strong  a  defensive  position  to  an  attack  from  the 
north  and  does  not  so  well  cover  the  railroad  junc- 
tion. Other  good  positions  in  the  neighborhood  un- 
cover Beverly  too  much. 

As  there  is  water  sufficient  for  his  men  at  the 
farm  and  the  animals  can  be  watered  in  the  nearby 
streams,  Major  A  decides  to  camp  at  Spinner.  He 
must  now  decide  on  his  outpost  dispositions  to  secure 
his  camp  against  surprise. 

He  first  studies  the  roads  available  to  the  enemy. 
There  is  a  road  and  railroad  along  the  river  from 
Weston  to  G  that  approaches  his  position  directly 
from  the  direction  of  the  enemy.  From  Weston  the 
enemy  has  a  road  from  21  to  49,  thence  to  G  or  E. 
From  E  he  can  move  600  yards  south  and  follow  the 
railroad  to  the  northwest  and  approach  the  position 
at  Spinner.  A  wider  detour  to  10  and  an  attack 
from  the  south  is  possible,  but  highly  improbable; 
the  enemy  would  thus  uncover  his  own  line  of  retreat, 
have  a  long  march,  and  gain  little.  If  the  enemy 
attacks  south  of  the  railroad  he  would  undoubtedly 
turn  the  ravine  west  of  Ode  and  not  try  to  force  a 
crossing. 

An  advance  between  the  two  roads  forking  at 
40  is  also  improbable  in  the  night;  the  stream  has 
steep  banks  and  constitutes  a  decided  obstacle.  The 
enemy  could  cross  on  the  bridge  south  of  49  and  then 
move  across  country,  but  would  lose  time  if  he  at- 
tempted it  in  the  night.  The  enemy  may  turn  off  at 
25  by  the  farm  road  and  move  down  the  spur.  From 


this  spur  to  the  Spinner  position  is  about  1,200  yards; 
to  advance  from  it  would  be  difficult,  and  the  range 
is  long  for  decisive  effect  for  infantry  fire. 

From  his  study  of  the  country  Major  A  concludes 
that  if  attacked  before  the  arrival  of  the  brigade  the 
enemy  will  approach  by  one  of  the  roads  above 
mentioned,  and  the  attack  will  probably  be  north  of 
the  railroad.  Which  road  or  roads  will  be  used  it  is 
impossible  to  foretell.  The  enemy  will  not  have 
artillery,  so  the  rifle  range  is  all  that  need  be  con- 
sidered. Much  of  the  line  need  only  be  patrolled, 
but  all  the  roads  must  be  held.  There  is  just  enough 
danger  of  a  wide  turning  movement  to  make  it  ad- 
visable to  keep  a  watch  to  the  south.  He  further 
decides  that  if  attacked  he  will  make  his  fight  for  the 
position  at  Spinner;  he  will  not  reenforce  the  outpost, 
but  have  it  fall  back  when  pressed,  uncovering  the 
main  position. 

The  outpost  line  should  therefore  extend  from 
the  Burlington  R.  R.  north  of  G  around  to  the  south- 
west to  the  Rock  Island  Railroad.  The  distance  to 
the  front  of  the  line  of  observation  need  not  exceed 
1,500  to  2,000  yards.  As  only  a  few  points  have  to 
be  more  than  merely  observed,  *  not  more  than  100 
men  are  necessary,  but  observing  the  rule  not  to 
break  unnecessarily  a  tactical  unit,  he  decides  to  de- 
tail a  company  complete.  For  reasons  explained  in 
the  talk  on  advance  guards,  he  selects  Company  E, 
the  present  advance  guard.  The  troops  for  a  detached 
post  far  from  the  outpost  proper  are  generally  taken 
from  the  main  body,  or,  in  large  outposts,  from  the 
reserve.  Major  A  decides  that  a  detached  post  of 
one  squad  located  just  east  of  the  little  woods  south 
of  Spinner  can  effectively  observe  that  section,  and 
decides  to  take  one  squad  from  E  Company.  His 
reasons  for  taking  it  from  this  company  are  that  the 
outpost  is  strong  enough  without  it  and  that  tomorrow 


all  the  men,  who  on  account  of  extra  duty  today  and 
tonight  should  be  spared  as  much  as  convenient,  will 
belong  to  one  company.  The  other  three  will  be  intact. 

Having  arrived  at  a  decision  as  above,  Major  A 
is  ready  to  issue  his  "halt  and  outpost"  order. 
This,  in  so  small  a  command,  would  usually  be  verbal 
and  direct  to  the  officers. 

Major  A  then  assembles  his  company  commanders 
and  issues  the  following  orders: 

'Information  has  been  received  that  small  par- 
ties of  the  enemy  were  seen  about  twelve  miles  north 
of  here  today. 

"Our  brigade  will  reach  here  tomorrow. 

"This  battalion  will  go  into  camp  near  the  Spin- 
ner house  yonder. 

"Company  E,  less  one  squad,  will  constitute  the 
outpost  and  will  establish  the  line  from  a  point  about 
three  fourths  of  a  mile  north  of  here  on  the  Burling- 
ton railroad  to  near  45,  thence  southeast  to  the  Rock 
Island  railroad. 

"A  detached  post  will  be  established  by  me  south 
of  camp. 

"In  case  of  attack  we  will  defend  the  position 
near  the  main  camp,  which  will  be  intrenched  as 
soon  as  camp  is  made. 

"Captain  E  (Company  E)  will  detach  one  squad 
under  a  sergeant  to  report  to  me. 

"I  will  be  with  the  main  body." 

Let  us  assume  that  Captain  E  has  studied  his 
map  and  the  ground  and  when  he  receives  his  order 
is  ready  to  post  his  men.  His  course  of  reasoning 
and  conclusions  are  practically  the  same  as  those  of 
Major  A. 

With  so  small  an  outpost  there  would  be  no  re- 
serve. The  squads  which  constituted  the  advance 
party,  flankers,  etc.,  during  the  day  will  be  in  the 
support  during  the  night. 


—47— 

Captain  D  decides  to  have  the  support  bivouac  a 
little  south  of  the  bridge  north  of  G,  to  which  point 
he  marches  his  support  if  not  already  there  and  then 
issues  his  outpost  order  to  his  company. 

Order: 

'  'Small  parties  of  the  enemy  have  been  seen  to- 
day about  twelve  miles  north  of  here. 

"The  battalion  camps  on  that  hill  near  the  Spin- 
ner farm  house. 

"The  support  will  bivouac  here. 

"If  attacked  the  position  at  Spinner  will  be  held. 

"First  Lieutenant  A  with  the  first  two  squads 
and  Sergeant  X,  move  out  on  the  F— E  road  about 
500  yards  beyond  the  second  bend  where  the  railroad 
diverges  from  the  wagon  road.  You  will  constitute 
Picket  No.  1.  You  will  observe  the  road  and  railroad 
to  your  front  and  patrol  to  the  head  of  the  ravine  to 
your  north. 

"Second  Lieutenant  B,  you  will  take  the  next 
two  squads  and  move  out  the  G— 47  road  about  300 
yards  beyond  47  and  constitute  Picket  No.  2.  You 
will  carefully  guard  the  bridge  to  your  north  and 
patrol  east  to  that  ravine  running  south  from  Bee 
Creek. 

"Sergeant  Y,  with  the  next  two  squads,  move 
up  the  river  road  to  near  the  next  bridge.  You  will 
constitute  Picket  No.  3.  Place  a  cossack  post  to  your 
right  on  this  hill  (pointing)  with  instructions  to  care- 
fully observe  the  country  to  the  north.  You  will 
patrol  along  the  railroad  to  the  north  and  prevent 
the  enemy  moving  undetected  through  the  woods 
along  the  river. 

"Cooked  meals  will  be  sent  to  the  pickets  from 
the  support. 

"I  will  be  with  the  support/' 

As  soon  as  the  pickets  just  detailed  are  in  posi- 


—48— 

tion  the  temporary  or  march  outguards  are  relieved 
and  come  into  the  bivouac. 

Captain  E  then  establishes  his  bivouac.  Three 
men  are  detailed  for  guard  (3  reliefs  of  one  man  each) 
and  a  noncommissioned  officer.  A  sentinel  must  be 
on  duty  all  the  time  of  the  bivouac. 

Men  are  also  detailed  for  patrol  duty;  at  least 
one  visiting  patrol  must  be  out  all  the  time.  In  this 
case  two  men  are  sufficient  for  a  patrol.  Three  re- 
liefs for  patrols =6  men. 

The  patrol  starting  from  the  support  would  move 
to  Picket  No.  1,  thence  to  No.  2,  thence  to  No.  3, 
and  back  to  the  support.  The  round  should  be  made 
in  less  than  an  hour. 

Having  attended  to  the  above  Captain  E  should 
now  inspect  his  pickets  and  satisfy  himself  that  his 
orders  have  been  understood  and  are  being  properly 
executed.  He  should  make  any  changes  he  finds 
necessary.  Captain  E  now  makes  a  report  of  his 
final  dispositions  to  the  battalion  commander.  It  is 
advisable  to  show  the  dispositions  of  the  troops  by 
means  of  a  single  sketch. 

Captain  E  causes  all  the  men  who  are  to  do  the 
patrolling  during  the  night  to  make  at  least  one  round 
before  dark  in  order  to  learn  the  country. 

Let  us  now  see  what  the  picket  commanders  do. 

Lieutenant  A  establishes  Picket  No.  1,  500  yards 
east  of  the  second  bend  in  the  road.  At  this  point 
the  distance  between  the  two  roads  is  about  100 
yards.  He  decides  to  make  his  bivouac  between  the 
two  roads,  to  place  one  sentinel  on  the  wagon  road, 
one  on  the  railroad,  and  one  between  at  the  picket. 
Double  sentinels  are  the  rule  on  such  posts  as  these 
on  roads.  One  double  sentinel  can  not  satisfactorily 
do  what  is  required  and  two  such  posts  require  too 
many  men.  In  this  case  all  three  sentinels  are  so 
close  together  that  the  middle  one  may  be  considered 


—49— 

as  the  double  to  each  of  the  others.  This  requires 
nine  men  for  sentinels.  He  must  have  three  patrols 
of  two  men  each— 6  men.  Two  noncommissioned 
officers  can  divide  the  night  in  charge  of  picket. 
Three  would  be  better  but  he  has  only  two  left,  but 
Lieutenant  A  can  take  some  of  the  work  himself. 
He  has  17  men  besides  himself  in  the  picket. 

He  decides  to  have  one  patrol  out  all  the  time. 
It  will  move  from  the  picket  north  of  the  head  of  the 
ravine  thence  southeast  of  the  knoll  near  E  in  the 
northeast  angle  of  the  wagon  road,  whence  both 
roads  can  be  seen,  then  back  to  the  picket  by  the 
same  route.  At  least  once  every  two  hours  a  patrol 
will  move  via  the  farm  road  to  Picket  No.  2.  Lieut. 
A  and  those  to  make  the  patrols  during  the  night  go 
over  the  route  before  dark. 

Lieutenant  B  establishes  his  picket  to  the  right 
(east)  of  the  railroad  due  south  of  the  bridge  and 
posts  a  double  sentinel  a  few  yards  from  the  picket. 
No  other  sentinel  at  the  picket  is  required.  Three 
patrols  of  two  men  each  are  detailed  to  patrol  from 
the  picket  east  to  the  ravine.  A  patrol  will  move 
back  and  forth  between  these  two  points.  He  has 
so  far  6  men  for  sentinels,  6  men  for  patrols  and  3 
noncommissioned  officers  or  privates  acting  as  such 
=15.  He  has  one  man  left  besides  himself.  He  de- 
cides to  have  a  patrol  to  Picket  No.  1,  going  by  way 
of  45  and  returning  via  G.  This  will  be  made  once 
in  two  hours  without  interfering  with  the  patrol  to 
the  ravine.  It  will  be  made  by  two  men  taken  from 
the  noncommissioned  officers,  sentinels  not  on  post 
and  the  extra  man.  Patrols  go  over  the  route  be- 
fore dark. 

Sergeant  Y  establishes  his  picket  in  the  mouth 
of  the  draw  east  of  the  little  railroad  bridge  and 
posts  a  double  sentinel  to  observe  to  the  northwest 
along  the  road  and  railroad.  He  detached  a  corporal 


—50— 

and  three  men  to  establish  a  cossack  post  about  due 
east  of  the  picket  on  the  ridge.  The  rest  of  his  men 
he  holds  in  readiness  for  patrolling.  Frequent  patrols 
will  be  made  well  to  the  front;  the  cossack  post  will 
be  visited  once  an  hour. 

During  broad  daylight  the  double  sentinels  may 
be  made  single  and  much  of  the  patrolling  omitted, 
but  from  sunset  to  broad  daylight  the  above  disposi- 
tions will  be  followed. 

This  disposition  requires  for  night  work,  if  there 
is  no  attack,  six  squads  and  two  sergeants  for  the 
three  pickets;  one  squad  for  the  detached  post.  The 
guard  and  patrols  at  the  support  requires  nine  men 
and  say  two  noncommissioned  officers.  A  total  of 
eight  squads  and  one  man  besides  four  additional 
noncommissioned  officers  or  a  grand  total  from  Com- 
pany E  of  69  men  out  of  the  128,  practically  one 
eighth  of  the  force. 

The  major  would  also  have  from  the  main  body  a 
small  camp  guard;  probably  a  single  sentinel  would 
be  sufficient,  at  most  two.  This  would  require  3  or  6 
privates  and  1  or  2  noncommissioned  officers. 

This  is  not  excessive,  particularly  when  we  con- 
sider that  full  work  is  only  required  during  darkness. 

The  next  question:  Has  he  economized  too  much, 
is  there  an  avenue  of  approach  too  open? 

If  the  enemy  comes  by  the  wagon  road  against 
the  front  of  Picket  No.  1,  he  is  met  by  two  squads; 
this  number  of  men  shooting  down  a  road  would  be 
quite  an  obstacle.  It  would  force  a  deployment  and 
regular  advance  and  this  would  take  time,  particu- 
larly in  the  dark;  the  enemy  having  deployed  would 
doubtless  be  able  to  push  back  the  men  of  the  picket, 
but  by  that  time  the  support  could  be  deployed  and 
ready  and  Picket  No.  2  would  soon  be  on  their  flank. 
By  the  time  the  enemy  was  oriented  and  in  condition 


—51— 

to  handle  this  force,  nearly  a  company  strong,  the 
main  body  would  be  adding  their  fire. 

If  he  comes  by  the  roads  against  either  of  the 
other  pickets  the  result  is  practically  the  same. 

Suppose  the  enemy  attacks  moving  across  country 
between  Picket  No.  2  and  49.  Crossing  the  stream 
with  its  steep  banks  will  take  some  time  for  a  force 
as  large  as  a  battalion,  and  is  certain  to  make  con- 
siderable noise.  One  or  the  other  of  the  two  patrols 
will  detect  it  early.  After  crossing  it  will  take  an 
appreciable  time  to  overcome  the  disorder  and  pre- 
pare to  advance  to  the  attack.  Pickets  Nos.  1  and  2 
are  ready  to  open  a  cross  fire  on  them  and  are  strong 
enough  to  cause  trouble  to  the  enemy  and  will  delay 
him.  The  support,  as  before,  deploys  and  is  ready. 

Suppose  the  enemy  moves  south  of  the  railroad 
to  turn  the  position.  He  would  hardly  attempt  to 
cross  the  ravine,  but  would  turn  it  bringing  him  in 
well  from  the  south.  The  detached  post  in  this 
vicinity  should  get  early  information  of  it  and  alarm 
the  main  camp.  The  squad  could  not  cause  much 
delay  but  could  cause  some,  for  the  enemy  must 
find  out  how  much  is  against  him.  The  distance  is 
so  great  that  by  the  time  the  enemy  was  within 
effective  range  for  night  firing  our  troops  could  be 
ready.  The  outpost  company,  or  part  of  it,  can 
move  against  the  enemy's  right  flank  during  his  ad- 
vance. The  enemy  would  be  running  such  a  great 
risk  in  such  a  move  unless  he  were  greatly  superior 
to  us  that  he  would  hardly  attempt  it. 

We  must  remember  that  the  force  which  has  to 
advance  in  the  dark  is  much  more  liable  to  confusion, 
disorder  and  mayhap  than  the  troops  in  position. 

The  enemy  "may  turn  south  via  25.  The  cossack 
post  should  see  him  in  time  to  give  ample  warning. 
This  post  could  not  cause  any  delay.  The  southern 
point  of  the  hill  is  over  1,200  yards  from  our  main 


body,  too  far  to  accomplish  anything  by  night  firing 
To  get  down  the  steep  bank  to  advance  would  be  con- 
siderably interfered  with  by  the  support  and  later  in 
their  advance  would  be  flanked  by  Pickets  1  and  2. 

The  distance  from  the  main  body  to  the  advance 
elements  of  Pickets  2  and  3  is  nearly  2,000  yards;  to 
Picket  No.  1  is  only  about  1,200  and  the  detached 
post  about  the  same.  This,  I  believe,  fulfills  the  re- 
quirement. Night  fire  by  infantry  is  effective  only 
at  short  range,  in  daylight  the  enemy  would  be  seen 
for  a  considerable  distance  before  he  reached  the  de- 
tached post  or  Picket  No.  1. 

I  do  not  believe  we  can  dispense  with  any  of  the 
men  we  have  used.  To  cut  out  one  of  our  sentinels 
or  patrols  from  the  pickets  would  leave  an  opening. 

The  patrolling  from  the  support  is  believed  neces- 
sary. 

This  problem  is  very  simple  and  in  solution  works 
out  rather  normally.  The  pickets  are  of  equal  size. 
This  will  not  be  the  rule.  To  each  picket  must  be 
assigned  men  enough  to  do  the  work  before  it.  One 
picket  may  have  two  or  three  double  sentinels,  an- 
other only  one.  In  some  cases  a  cossack  or  sentry 
squad  would  be  used,  and  the  pickets  would  vary 
from  two  squads  to  a  company. 

You  must  also  bear  in  mind  that  generally  there 
is  more  than  one  correct  solution.  Whatever  disposi- 
tion gives  necessary  security  with  the  minimum  of 
men  is  absolutely  correct. 


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)V    7    1938 


5942 


"LIJ 


LD  21-95m-7,'37 


Gaylord  Bros. 

Makers 

Syracuse,  N.  Y. 
PAT.  JAN.  21,1908 


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